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DOES DOCTRINE MATTER? 
Frederick Schauer* 
THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T. 
Edited by Vincent Blasi New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press. 1983. Pp. xiv, 326. $25. 
If the United States can be said to have a dominant legal theory, 
that theory must be some version of Legal Realism. Formalism -
treating legal rules as both totally binding and capable of mechani-
cal application - continues to be the favorite straw man for a wide 
variety of critiques, I but it remains virtually impossible to locate real 
people who espouse formalism or who perform their role in a for-
malist fashion.2 Yet Realism continues to be well-defended in the 
legal academy, among practicing lawyers, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, among the population as a whole.3 No matter how frequently 
or how resoundingly the strongest claims4 of Realism have been re-
futed, 5 those claims, like the hydra, keep returning to torment us. 
In a way, the persistence of Realism in the United States is as 
anomalous as it is surprising. For the claims that law is far less than 
it pretends to be have been the strongest in this most legalistic and 
most litigious of nations. One likely explanation for the common 
acceptance of Realism in the United States is the special nature of 
the United States Constitution and the pervasiveness of constitu-
tional adjudication. When a constitution contains such vague man-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1967, M.B.A. 1968, Dartmouth College; 
J.D. 1972, Harvard University. Professor Schauer is the author of FREE SPEECH : A PHILO-
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982) (reviewed in this issue). - Ed. 
1. E.g., D. Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1-2 
(D. Kairys ed. 1982) (reviewed in this issue). A less extreme formalism is described in Unger, 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 564-65 (1983). 
2. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15-16 (1977); see also Hutcheson, The 
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 
(1929). 
3. See, e.g., D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. I (1983); Nowak, Realism, 
Nihilism, and the Supreme Court: Do the Emperors Have Nothing But Robes?, 22 WASHBURN 
L.J. 246 (1983); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neu-
tral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet, Critique]; Tushnet, · 
Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1983). 
4. I recognize that Legal Realism in its most extreme form, including the less guarded 
statements of both Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn, is not necessarily representative of all of 
Legal Realism, and that the more refined and sophisticated versions of Realism have made 
major contributions to our understanding of the legal enterprise. I will leave to the reader the 
judgment of whether I am here arguing against straw men or against real people. 
5. The classic refutation of Realism, albeit a somewhat caricatured Realism, is H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50 (1961). 
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dates as "due process of law," "equal protection of the laws," "cruel 
and unusual punishments," "unreasonable searches and seizures," 
and "commerce . . . among the several states," when the issues aris-
ing under those provisions are among the most important that a soci-
ety confronts, when judicial decision of those issues is frequent and 
active, and when the decisionmakers are chosen at least in part on 
the basis of their political predispositions, the divergence between 
the myth of judges as mechanical appliers of precise rules and their 
actual practice is greatest. Consequently, the Realist impulse is 
greatest with respect to constitutional adjudication, particularly in 
the Supreme Court. Because the external observer is forced to con-
front decisions that undoubtedly reflect the political values of the 
justices, it is easy for such an observer to conclude that decisionmak-
ing by the Supreme Court is entirely political, unconstrained by con-
stitutional tests, the original intentions of the drafters,6 or, most 
importantly in the instant context, prior decisions of the Supreme 
Court.7 And if this is the case, then one would expect a change in 
personnel on the Court to produce a dramatic change in the deci-
sions that emanate from the Court. 
The volume under discussion is most important for its powerful 
refutation of the thesis that doctrine does not matter and that a 
change in personnel on the Court will produce decisions unfettered 
by the developed principles of previous courts. In assessing the work 
of the Burger Court, Professor Blasi and his colleagues8 have, in va-
rying degrees, concluded that the Burger Court has departed from 
Warren Court precedents far less than was a}lticipated, that there has 
been no wholesale rejection of prior decisions or existing principles, 
and that the predictions and characterizations of a constitutional 
counter-revolution wrought by the Burger Court have, to say the 
least, been exaggerated. In drawing this conclusion, the writers as-
sembled here do not contend that the Justices who now most com-
monly comprise the Court's majority are, in fact, less politically or 
even legally conservative than was originally supposed. Rather, they 
have, by and large, concluded that doctrine, precedent, and related 
institutional considerations have exerted a considerable restraining 
influence on what might otherwise have been the more extreme 
political predilections of the Court's personnel. I do not find this 
conclusion surprising. What I do find surprising is the number of 
people for whom the conclusion is surprising. But they do exist, and 
6. I am not conceding that original intent ought to be a constraint, see Schauer, An Essay 
on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982), but this is unquestionably a minor-
ity view. If in fact original intent ought to be a constraint, then I would maintain that it could 
operate as such. 
7. See Tushnet, Critique, supra note 3. 
8. The book is sponsored by the Society of American Law Teachers, whose aims are set 
forth at p. x. 
February 1984] Does Doctrine Matter? 657 
in large numbers, and this book will have performed an enormous 
service if it can convince some of those people that doctrine does 
matter. 
I . 
The very designation "The Burger Court" merits some reflection. 
Clearly Professor Blasi did not make up that title, and he admits that 
it is not much more than "a common expedient to use changes in the 
identity of the chief justice as dividing lines for demarcating seg-
ments of Supreme Court history" (p. xi). But the frequency with 
which we use this common expedient may, as with many convenient 
shorthand designations, blind us to the underlying complexities. 
Chief Justice Burger is indeed the nominal head of the Court, but 
Warren Burger as a justice is but one of a number of justices all of 
whom were selected, at least in part, for their particular conservative 
outlook, and because they were perceived as having little sympathy 
for the general tenor of the decisions and decisionmaking process of 
the Warren Court. Warren Burger is undoubtedly far less significant 
in this context than the forces and individuals who were responsible 
for his appointment as well as the appointments of Harry Blackmun, 
William Rehnquist, Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra 
O'Connor. But even to refer to "The Nixon Court" is, if not unfair 
or erroneous, then at least distracting. For the crimes of Nixon the 
man are almost completely irrelevant in the context of discussing the 
appointment and performance of four justices whose selection un-
doubtedly reflected an emerging political mood at the time of their 
appointment. From this perspective it is perhaps more accurate to 
refer to "The People's Court," but that designation has apparently 
been preempted. 
I mean to suggest by this that the very act of characterizing a 
Court in terms of its personnel is likely to give an unjustified pri-
macy to personality over doctrine and is likely as well to focus on 
changes rather than on continuity. Indeed, it is one of the major 
strengths of this book that it has managed to transcend many of the 
limitations and distortions inherent in the definition of its mission. 
But the mission itself is still worth thinking about. Chronological 
approaches to constitutional law are, to say the least, passe,9 and 
with good reason. Both the development of constitutional doctrine 
and the development of the Supreme Court as an institution are 
marked by the persistence of themes as well as by changing themes; 
by the growth of some doctrines as others go into decline; by areas of 
turmoil coexisting with pockets of stability; and, most importantly, 
by phenomena, doctrinal or otherwise, that persist in the face of 
9. For an interesting historical curiosity, see J. SHOLLEY, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
{1951), a casebook organized along strictly chronological lines. 
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changing personnel, or that change in the face of a stable makeup in 
the membership of the Court. 
I mention these impressions only to encourage readers of Blasi's 
book, or others like it, to approach the enterprise with a skeptical 
eye. There are many windows through which one may view the 
Supreme Court and constitutional doctrine, and a chronologically 
demarcated and doctrinally subdivided 10 window is only one of 
them. Moreover, a chronological evaluation of the work of the 
Court is most useful if done against a backdrop of a chronological 
assessment of the society in which the Court operates. That is, we 
must be wary of attributing too much doctrinal change to changes in 
the personalities that sit on the Court, and not enough to changes in 
society that might influence even a stably constituted Court. As 
Martin Shapiro suggests in his important concluding essay, 11 evalua-
tion of judicial philosophy must take place with reference both to 
"the . . . stage of American social and political development" (p. 
225) within which a Court operates, and also to the backgrounds and 
training of those who are doing the evaluating. If we can imagine 
that American social and political development progressed exactly as 
it did from 1968 to 1982, with but one exception -Justices Warren, 
Black, pouglas, and Fortas remained on the Court - is it so clear 
that the themes of the Warren Court would have been extended, 
rather than experiencing a period of retrenchment or reversal in the 
face of political and popular reaction? I can provide no certain an-
swer to this hypothetical question, but just as we may now be exper-
iencing more "the Court of the 1970's and 1980's" than "the Burger 
Court," so too may we in the recent past have experienced less "the 
Warren Court" than "the Court of the 1960's."12 
II 
Turning more specifically to the essays collected in this volume, 
all of them, in one way or another, support the theme that there was 
far more continuity and far less cataclysm than was expected when 
the personnel of the Court changed from "the Warren Court" to "the 
Burger Court."13 Judge Ginsburg's sympathetic discussion of the 
10. With the exception of the essays by Professors Blasi and Shapiro, all of the contribu-
tions are oriented around specific substantive areas rather than broader themes. 
11. "Fathers and Sons: The Court, The Co=entators, and the Search for Values," pp. 
218-38. 
12. In a society in which the courts in general and the Supreme Court in particular are 
highly visible institutions deciding many of the great issues of the day, the relationship be-
tween courts and values is especially complex. To some extent the values of the times are 
created by courts, particularly the Supreme Court, as much as those values are reflected by the 
courts. Did the Warren Court reflect that social/political/chronological phenomenon known 
as the 1960's, or did it help to create it? I am quite confident that the answer must be "Both." 
13. On what people expected, I rely not only on my own recollection, but also on Anthony 
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Burger Court's creation of and adherence to close scrutiny of gender-
based classifications14 would hardly support the charge that equality 
as a value has been abandoned, or even constricted. A similar con-
clusion can be drawn from Professor Brest's analysis of the race dis-
crimination cases, 15 particularly his conclusion that "a relatively 
conservative Court in a conservative political environment has con-
tinued to press ... hard for integrated schools" (p. 119). Professor 
Bennett's essay on poverty law appears to this reader as substantially 
less sympathetic to the Burger Court, 16 but even here the theme is 
more that a different court might have done more, rather than that 
this particular court has been actively antagonistic to the claims of 
the poor. Yet I wonder whether any real Court, sitting in the 1970's, 
or perhaps even in the 1960's, would have decided the Burger 
Court's docket in a drastically different fashion. Professor Bennett 
justifiably focuses, in part, on San Antonio Independent School .Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 11 and that invites the question of whether even a 
Court of nine Earl Warrens would have decided that case differently, 
especially given the enormous social, political, and economic up-
heaval that such a result would have brought about, and given the 
enormous difficulties of enforcement such a decision would have oc-
casioned. These considerations are suggested by Professor Bennett 
himself (p. 55), and to that extent he too is a supporter of the book's 
theme18 that stability has been more important than change in the 
shift from Warren Court to Burger Court. 
Three of the essays in this book make special attempts to locate 
themes running through specific substantive areas of Burger Court 
jurisprudence. Professors Dorsen and Gora see a special solicitude 
for private property as a unifying theme for many of the Court's free 
speech decisions, 19 and Professor Burt sees a particular authoritarian 
vision of the family as tying together the Burger Court's family law 
decisions.20 In both of these instances the explanatory theme seems 
strained, but I cheerfully acknowledge th_at this criticism is but an 
Lewis's statement in his Foreword to this book that "many expected to see the more striking 
constitutional doctrines of the Warren years rolled back or even abandoned." P. vii. 
14. ''The Burger Court's Grapplings with Sex Discrimination," pp. 132-56. 
15. "Race Discrimination,'' pp. 113-31. 
16. ''The Burger Court and the Poor,'' pp. 46-61. 
17. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding the use oflocal property taxes to finance public schools). 
18. Especially given the book's sponsorship, there is no reason to believe that the book's 
theme, embodied in its subtitle, was planned in advance. It seems much more likely that this 
theme emerged without any overall intention to promote this message on the part of either the 
editor or the sponsor. The emergent theme, and its prominence in the subtitle and the intro-
ductory matter, are thus a credit to the integrity of the editor and the sponsor. 
19. ''The Burger Court and the Freedom of Speech," pp. 28-45. 
20. ''The Burger Court and the Fanilly,'' pp. 92-112. 
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offshoot of my general skepticism of unifying explanatory themes.21 
Professor Emerson, in discussing freedom of the press,22 also finds 
an explanatory theme, but of a somewhat different variety. Al-
though he too finds some aspects of the Burger Court's record either 
worthy of praise or less harmful than was anticipated, his evaluation 
is largely negative, and he places most of the blame on the Court's 
continued use of an increasingly vague balancing standard (pp. 14-
15, 26). I had hoped that we had left the dispute between absolutists 
and balancers well behind us,23 for that characterization obscures far 
more issues than it illuminates. 24 Given his unquestioned commit-
ment to an extremely strong principle of freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press, I wonder whether Professor Emerson would prefer 
a set of absolute rules designed by Justice Rehnquist to ad hoc bal-
ancing by Justice Marshall.25 
The essays that seem best to capture the spirit of the book (or, to 
be frank, that aspect of the book with which I am most sympathetic) 
are those that eschew unifying themes, and see in the work of the 
Burger Court some reinforcement and strengthening of Warren 
Court doctrines, some dilution or whittling away at other doctrines 
inherited from the 1960's, and some areas in which the work of the 
Burger Court is not capable of so simple a characterization. This 
pluralistic assessment is particularly evident in Professor Kamisar's 
essay on criminal procedure,26 Professor Brest's on race discrimina-
tion,27 and Professor St. Antoine's on labor law.28 It also seeps 
through Professor Blasi's own substantive contribution to the vol-
ume, in which he finds in the Burger Court an activism not dissimi-
lar in general judicial philosophy from that which characterized the 
Warren Court, but far less unified by a particular social, political, or 
philosophical vision.29 These essays, more than any of the others in 
the book, implicitly support the view that an underlying phenome-
non of stability can temper or prevent significant doctrinal changes 
even as the personnel of the Court changes. 
21. See Schauer, supra note 6; Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Fer-
ber, 1982 SuP. CT. REv. 285. 
22. "Freedom of the Press under the Burger Court," pp. 1-27. 
23. See Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 V AND. L. 
REV. 265, 296-305 (1981). 
24. See Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV, 1284 (1983). 
25. See Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice 
Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972). 
26. "The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It 
Really So Prosection-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices," pp. 62-91. 
27. "Race Discrimination," pp. 113-31. 
28. "Individual Rights in the Work Place: The Burger Court and Labor Law," pp. 157-79. 
29. "The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court," pp. 198-217. 
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III 
It is possible, of course, that the expected counter-revolution did 
not occur merely because the wrong people sat on the Court. Per-
haps Richard Nixon and subsequent presidents merely misjudged 
the attitudes of those they appointed. Maybe Warren Burger, Wil-
liam Rehnquist, Lewis Powell, Harry Blackm.un, John Paul Stevens, 
and Sandra O'Connor hold personal political, moral, and social 
views that do not differ significantly from those justices who made 
up the majority of the Warren Court during the height of its powers. 
Although the personnel did not remain constant, representative indi-
viduals would include Earl Warren, William Brennan, Thurgood 
Marshall, Hugo Black, William Douglas, Arthur Goldberg, and Abe 
Fortas. If in fact the members of the first listed group hold political 
views substantially similar to those held by members of the second 
listed group, then even the most uncompromising Legal Realist 
would not expect significant changes in the course of the Court's 
decisions. 
This hypothesis may be correct, but I am quite willing to assume 
(with little risk of contradiction) that it is not. The reason for putting 
it this way is to make it easier to focus on the pertinent issue. If we 
assume what is probably the case, that the typical "Burger Court" 
majority holds personal political and philosophical opinions that dif-
fer substantially from the opinions held by the typical "Warren 
Court" majority, then the occasionally explicit and pervasively im-
plicit theme of this book is that Supreme Court justices frequently 
vote in ways that are contrary to their own political and philosophi-
cal views. Why, we must then ask, would they do this? 
One reason is that the Court as an institution possesses only a 
finite, and indeed quite limited, amount of political capital, and that 
it must husband this capital carefully in order to preserve its author-
ity.30 This may explain why, in the not so distant past, the same 
Court that decided .Brown v. Board of Education 31 could not at the 
same time have taken a strong stand against McCarthyism.32 From 
this perspective, the members of the Burger Court might be said by 
some (but not by me) to have an agenda, but one that must be dealt 
with bit by bit. In order to preserve its political capital, the argu-
ment would go, the Court cannot reverse all of the dirty deeds of the 
Warren Court in one fell swoop, but must instead operate slowly in 
order to achieve its own objectives. Indeed, this might even explain 
those areas, such as sex discrimination, commercial speech, and 
abortion, in which the decisions of the Burger Court seem legiti-
30. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
32. This point is noted by Professor Shapiro. Pp. 221-22. 
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mately "liberal." These might merely be diversions, designed to lull 
the liberals into complacency while individual rights are being sig-
nificantly eroded in other areas. Under a sufficiently sophisticated 
conspiracy theory, any seemingly obvious counter-example to the 
original thesis can be fitted neatly into the conspiracy. 
Alternatively, the Court might be said to be afraid of the political 
checks that are available to control its mistakes or its excesses. Jus-
tices can be impeached, the jurisdiction of the Court can be curtailed 
by Congress, and the Constitution can be amended to correct unpop-
ular decisions. Deterred by these actual and potential checks inher-
ent in the constitutional design, the members of the Burger Court 
might be reluctant to give full rein to their political or philosophical 
views for fear of congressional or other reprisal. 
Apart from the fact that the specific checks I have mentioned are 
cumbersome, unpopular, or constitutionally dubious procedures, it is 
apparent that none of these checks apply in the current political cli-
mate. If the Supreme Court were in 1984 to reverse Miranda v. Ari-
zona ,33 Mapp v. Ohio,34 Abington School .District v. Schempp,35 
Reynolds v. Sims,36 Green v. New Kent County School Board,31 and 
(perhaps) New York Times Co. v. Su//ivan 38 and (perhaps) Brown v. 
Board of Education ,39 I seriously doubt that there would be sufficient 
uproar to produce impeachment, congressional control, or constitu-
tional amendment. Indeed, I suspect that the jeers would be 
drowned out by the applause.40 And if that is correct, then the phe-
nomenon identified by this book can be stated even more starkly. 
Why would a group of Supreme Court justices vote in ways contrary 
to their own political and philosophical predispositions, when they 
can be confident that a vote in accordance with those predispositions 
would be quite popular with any constituency or political body hav-
ing actual or potential control over the Supreme Court? 
The answer, of course, is that the Supreme Court, for all of its 
political aspects, for all of the politically charged decisions it must 
make, and for all of the political input into the appointment of the 
justices, is still, in a very important respect, a court. What is in-
volved in being a court is, of course, an enormously complicated set 
of considerations, and a book review is hardly the place to present an 
33. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
34. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
35. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
37. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
40. For an interesting empirical study of public attitudes toward prevailing constitutional 
doctrine, see H. MCCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE (1983). 
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entire theory of law, even assuming I had one. But in this context at 
least some aspects of the special nature of judicial decision are worth 
mentioning. 
Perhaps most importantly, precedent does matter. The most re-
cent series of abortion decisions, in particular City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health ,41 demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court does consider stare decisis a constraint, even though that con-
straint is far less than absolute.42 And a pervasive theme of this 
book is the reluctance of the Burger Court to overturn Warren Court 
precedents. This should not come as any great revelation. Cases 
that may seem questionable when decided can become entrenched 
features of the legal landscape, with Marbury v. Madison 43 undoubt-
edly the most noteworthy example. Plainly it is within the power 
and province of a subsequent court to interpret a precedent either 
expansively or narrowly, but it is still the established precedent that 
provides the touchstone for subsequent argument and decision. 
Even a narrow interpretation of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 44 
would be far more protective of the press than was the state of the 
law before that case, and a grudging rather than enthusiastic applica-
tion of Brown is still a major advance over Plessy v. Ferguson .45 
Courts are constrained not only by precedent, but also by the 
necessity of justifying their decisions in written opinions, requiring 
as a result some degree of coherence and consistency. Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion for a unanimous Court in Jenkins v. Georgia46 most 
likely did not reflect his own pre-legal political and philosophical 
views, but that clearly did not stop him from writing an opinion that 
was essentially compelled by the doctrine implicit in earlier cases. 
To suggest that coherence, consistency, stare decisis, justification 
of results, and related constraints are essential parts of the legal en-
terprise is not to say that any of these, or other legal constraints, are 
invariably effective. It is common to look at certain less glorious 
episodes in Supreme Court history, such as the Court's quick turn-
around in the flag salute cases47 and in the shopping center picketing 
cases,48 to demonstrate that doctrine and precedent "really" do not 
41. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). 
42. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 
665 (1944), both quoted by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion in Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 
2508 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See generally Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions 
Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
43. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
44. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
46. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 
47. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville School 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
48. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); 
Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). This 
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matter. But I still fail to understand how it is possible to make the 
move from doctrine as non-dispositive to doctrine as irrelevant. The 
premise that doctrine does not inevitably control does not in any way 
entail the conclusion that doctrine does not matter. Constitutional 
doctrine and constitutional precedent channel behavior and thinking 
in the direction established by that doctrine and that precedent. This 
channeling establishes, at the very least, a presumption, albeit rebut-
table, in favor of the doctrine. It takes a special kind of reason, a 
special force of argument, to reject established doctrine, reasons and 
arguments of a force not required if precedent and doctrine are to be 
followed. 
No law of nature requires the foregoing observations to be true. 
They are true only if and because people, and in particular judges, 
think in particular ways. If in fact they think only as organs of na-
ked political power, then it would be unlikely that they would think 
in accordance with the internalized guidelines that I described in the 
previous paragraph. 
But it is hardly surprising that judges would have internalized49 
the powerful though not inexorable constraints of doctrine, prece-
dent, and consistency. They are members of a society that itself has 
internalized the notion that law and legal rules are constraining 
forces. They have been to law school where that view was pressed 
upon them for three years. They have practiced law under the con-
straints of legal rules. And for most of the justices of the Supreme 
Court, they have served as judges in some other capacity before join-
ing the Court. With all of this conditioning to the view that legal 
doctrine does matter, it would be phenomenal if that view did not 
influence the behavior of Supreme Court justices. Self-fulfilling 
prophecy it may be, but that is not the same as an empty myth. 
I have not here provided evidence for my impressionistic asser-
tions that doctrine does matter. It seems to me so obvious that it 
does matter that I assume that the burden ought to be on those who 
claim that it does not. But if evidence is required, I can think of no 
better place to start than with this collection of essays. For if doc-
trine does not matter, then one would expect to see that demon-
strated most vividly in the decisions of the Supreme Court with 
respect to matters of great political importance on which the per-
sonal political and philosophical views of a majority of the justices 
are inconsistent with the precedents established by their predeces-
sors. By providing a clear refutation of this hypothesis, this book has 
made a powerful demonstration that doctrine does matter. 
example is stressed by Kairys in Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE, supra note 1, at 12-15. 
49. On the internalization of legal norms, see generally H.L.A. HART, supra note 5. 
